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Abstract
In wireless sensor network, most of the queries are issued at the base station or
gateway node the network. However, there are some critical WSN applications
where real-time data are needed. But data at base station may not be real-time
because of communication delay or periodic nature of data collection. So, real-time
data can be accessed from the sensor nodes directly on demand. Before allowing
the user to access real-time data from the sensor node, authentication of user must
be ensured. But user authentication in case of wireless sensor network is a very
critical task, as sensor nodes are deployed in unattached environment and are prone
to possible hostile network attacks. Any authentication protocol in WSN must be
designed keeping the fact that sensor nodes have limited computing power, memory,
energy and communication capabilities.
In this thesis, an improved user authentication protocol based on Elliptic Curve
Cryptography (ECC) has been introduced for hierarchical wireless sensor networks
(HWSN). This thesis shows that the ECC based protocol is suitable for wireless
sensor networks, where higher security is demanded. Besides this the proposed
scheme provides mutual authentication and a secret session key for communication
between the user and the cluster head. It also provides an option for addition
or replacement of cluster head in the network whenever there is a need. Then a
comparative study of the proposed scheme with various existing is presented.
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Introduction
1.1 Introduction
Wireless sensor networks are distributed networks of autonomous sensors and
are used to monitor physical or environmental condition. Recent technological
advancements in micro-electro-mechanical systems technology, digital electronics
and wireless communications have facilities the developments of a small size sensor
node which are low cost, low power and multifunctional miniature devices having
sort communication range [3]. Each sensor node is capable of only a limited amount
of processing, but their collaborative eorts have the ability to measure a given
physical environment in great detail. So a wireless sensor network can be described
as a collection of sensor nodes which co-ordinate to perform some particular action.
Dierentiating them from traditional networks, sensor networks depend on high
deployment density and co-ordinate among themselves to carry their task. These
sensors can be deployed in two dierent ways [3].
• In rst case, sensor nodes can be placed far from the actual event, i.e.,
something sensed by perception. In this case, uses of some complex procedures
are required to dierentiate the targets from surrounding noise.
• In second case, several sensor nodes which do only the sensing job can
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be deployed. The positions of the sensor nodes and their topology of
communications are carefully handled. They send time series of the sensed
data to the central nodes where these data are processed and computations
are performed, and data are aggregated.
A WSN is comprised of a huge number of sensor nodes, which are deployed densely
either inside the monitoring area or very close to it. The pre-determination of
position of sensor nodes is not needed, which permits deployments of sensor nodes
in a remote territory. Besides that, sensor network protocols and algorithms must
possess self-organizing capabilities. Sensor nodes co-operate with each other to
achieve their goal. They are equipped with an in-built processor. They do not
send the raw data directly to the nodes which are responsible for the data fusion.
They use their processing abilities to perform simple computations locally and then
perform transmission of the required and partially processed data [3].
Wireless sensor networks are generally deployed for the dierent variety of
applications, which often includes environment monitoring, enemy movements
sensing and tracking in a battle eld, etc. Each sensor node has limited resources
such as energy, computation power, memory. Sensor nodes are deployed in hostile
environment. So they are in direct contact with environment. They communicate
trough wireless media. These factors make them vulnerable to various attacks [1].
Thus, access control becomes a very important requirement.
Organization of the Chapter
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 1.2, dierent types of
constraint in WSN is described. In Section 1.3, security requirements of WSNs is
given. In Section 1.4, access control challenges in WSNs is described. Section 1.5
shows authentication problems in WSNs. Section 1.6 and Section 1.7 describes
motivation and research objective respectively. Section 1.8 shows the organization
of the whole thesis. Finally, Section 1.9 gives the summary of the chapter.
2
Chapter 1 Introduction
1.2 Obstacles of Sensor Security
A wireless sensor network is dierent from a traditional computer network as it is
having many constraints compared to the traditional computer network. Because of
these constraints, it is dicult to apply existing security approaches to the wireless
sensor networks directly. Those constraints are described below as [4], [5].
1.2.1 Limited Resources
A certain amount of resources is required by every security approaches for the
implementation, including memory, storage memory, processing power, code space
and energy. In case of wireless sensor networks, sensor nodes have a limited amount
of memory, storage, processing power and energy to run them.
Limited Memory and Storage Space
A sensor node is a very tiny device having a limited amount of memory and storage
space for processing and storing values. To make an eective security mechanism,
it is necessary to make the amount of codings required for the security algorithm
small.
Power Limitation
The main constraint to wireless sensor capabilities is energy. It is hard to replace
those sensors considering high operating cost. It is also dicult to recharge those
sensors. In order to increase life of individual sensor nodes and the whole sensor
network the amount of energy or battery charge carried by those nodes must be
conserved. While applying any cryptographic protocol or function within sensor
node, energy impact due to those security enhancements on the sensor node must
be considered. Here the interest is to nd the impact of the added security on the
life span of a sensor that means battery life of sensors. Extra power is invested in
processing required for security functions like encryption, decryption, signing data,
3
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verifying signatures, etc. or transmitting data related to security or overhead like
IV (initialization vectors ) needed for encryption/decryption or the energy required
for storing the security parameters securely like cryptographic key.
1.2.2 Unreliable Communication
Another threat to sensor security is unreliable communication. The security of
WSNs depends heavily on a user's security protocol that is again dependent on
communication.
Unreliable Transfer
The routing protocols used in a wireless sensor network are packet-based, and these
routing protocols are connectionless, hence inherently unreliable. Due to channel
errors, packet may get damaged or may be dropped in the path because of highly
congested nodes. The results are lost due to damaged packets or dropped packets.
Another cause of damaged packets is the unreliable wireless communication channel.
So resources are used to avoid channel error and in wireless communication, channel
error rate is very high. It is possible that during transmission necessary security
packets, like a cryptographic key, may be lost if proper error handling is not included
in the protocol.
Conicts
Considering the communication channel to be reliable, there may be a case that
the communication itself is unreliable. The reason behind this is the broadcast
behaviour of the wireless sensor network. The transfer will fail, if the packets meet
in the middle of transfer, due to conict. This can be a major problem in case of
high dense sensor network [6].
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Latency
Another factor is latency. Latency can be increased due to network congestion,
multi-hop routing and node processing, which will make it dicult in achieving
synchronization among sensor nodes. The synchronization issues can make it hard
for maintaining sensor security as security mechanism depends on critical event
reports and cryptographic key distribution [7].
1.2.3 Unattended Operation
The sensor nodes may be left unattended for a long period of time which depends on
function of the particular sensor network. There are mainly three types of concerned
factors for the unattached sensor nodes:
Exposure to Physical Attacks
Generally, sensors are deployed in an environment which is open to adversaries, and
also open to dierent physical condition like bad weather and so on. There are always
potential risks that a sensor may suer a physical attack in those environments which
is very rare in case of typical PCs, which are located in a secure location and usually
suer attacks from networks.
Managed Remotely
The management of sensor network is done remotely, which make it impossible to
nd or detect physical tampering (like tamper proof seals) and physical maintenance
(like replacement of battery). Most extreme example of sensor network is when, it
is used for remote reconnaissance missions behind enemy lines. In that situation,
there may not be any physical contacts with friendly force after their deployment.
5
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No Central Management Point
A sensor network is distributed network, which does not have a central management
point. This property will increase the vitality of the sensor network. However, if it
is not designed correctly, it will make the network organization dicult, fragile and
inecient.
1.3 Security Requirements
A Wireless sensor network is a unique type of network. It shares some similarities
with common computer network, but it also poses some unique requirements. Some
security requirements are described below. Among those requirements, some of
them are typical network requirements, and others are unique to wireless sensor
networks [4].
1.3.1 Data condentiality
Data condentiality is the very important issue in network security. Whatever
may be security requirements in a network data condentiality problem must be
addressed rst. In wireless sensor networks following are some situation where data
condentiality comes into picture [4], [8] [5]:
• A sensor network should not leak information read by itself to its neighbors.
Especially in a military application or battle eld application as the data stored
in the sensor node may be highly sensitive.
• It is very important to build a secure channel in a wireless sensor network
as in many applications, nodes communicate highly sensitive data, e.g., key
distribution.
• Public sensor information like identity of sensor nodes and public keys, must
be encrypted to protect them against trac analysis attacks.
6
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The general approach to keep a sensitive data secret is to save those data in
encrypted form with a secret key that is only possessed by the legitimate receivers
thus condentiality is achieved.
1.3.2 Data Integrity
After implementation of condentiality, an attacker may not be able to steal
information, but that does not make the data stored in sensor node in the network
safe. There are possibilities that adversary can change the data so that it can put
the network in disarray. A compromised or malicious node may manipulate data
or add some wrong fragments to the data within the packets. This new packet can
then be sent to the original receiver. In some cases, data loss or damage can occur
without the presence of a malicious node. Severe communication can also lead to
data loss or damage. Thus, data integrity ensures that any received data has not
been altered during transmission.
1.3.3 Data Freshness
Even if we managed to maintain condentiality and data integrity, there is no
guarantee that received messages are fresh ones. Data freshness ensures that received
messages are not replayed and should be fresh and created recently. In a design,
where shared key strategies are employed, data freshness plays a very important
role. Generally shared keys are needed to change over time. However, to propagate
these shared keys over the network will take time. The adversary can easily perform
replay attack. If a sensor is unaware of the new key change time, then it makes an
adversary to disrupt the normal work of sensors easily. To ensure data freshness a
time stamp or nonce can be added to the packet.
7
Chapter 1 Introduction
1.3.4 Availability
Implementing traditional encryption methods and adjust them to t within WSNs
is not free. It will introduce some extra overheads. Some of them choose some
approaches that it can modify the code to reuse as much code as possible. Some
of them use traditional communication to meet the same goal. In some cases, it
may happen that some approaches force strict limitations on the data access or in
order to make it simple some unsuitable scheme like a central point scheme may be
proposed. However, all the approaches can weaken the availability of a sensor and
sensor network for reasons described below [4]:
• Additional computation consumes additional energy. If all energies are
consumed that means no more energy exists and sensor nodes are dead, the
data will no longer be available.
• Additional communication also consumes more energy. Another problem is,
as communication increases so does the chance of incurring a communication
conict.
• If a central point scheme is used, the chance of single point failure will increase
which in turns badly aects the availability of the network.
The security requirements aect the operation of WSN and it also very important
for maintaining availability of entire sensor network.
1.3.5 Self-Organization
A wireless sensor network is a basically a ad-hoc network. It requires every sensor
node to be independent and exible enough to be self-healing and self-organizing
depending upon dierent situations. In case of wireless sensor networks, there is
no xed infrastructure. Those features bring a great challenge to wireless sensor
network security as well.
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1.3.6 Time Synchronization
There are so many applications that depend upon some form of time synchronization.
However, in order to save power, a sensor's radio may be turned o for periods of
time. Furthermore, sensors may wish to compute the end-to-end delay of a packet
as it travels between two pairwise sensors. A sensor network may require group
synchronization for tracking applications, etc.
1.3.7 Secure Localization
The utility of a sensor network often depends upon its ability to correctly and
automatically locates every sensor node in the network. A sensor network designed
to locate faults will need accurate location information in order to nd the particular
point of a fault. The attacker can easily change non-secured point of fault
information by reporting wrong signal strengths, replaying network signals [4].
1.3.8 Access control
Access control is a critical security task in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs). To
restrict malicious nodes and unauthorized user from joining the sensor network,
access control is necessary. On one hand, WSN must be able to authorize and grant
users the right to access to the network. On the other hand, WSN must organize
data collected by sensors in such a way that an unauthorized entity (the adversary)
cannot make arbitrary queries. This restricts the network access only to eligible users
and sensor nodes, while queries from outsiders will not be answered or forwarded by
nodes [1].
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1.4 Access Control Challenges
1.4.1 Sensor Network Architecture
The wireless sensor network is a large network in which a huge number of sensor
nodes is deployed over a large area which is having one or more sink nodes or
base stations. These base stations are trusted by all sensor nodes. Considering
two dierent kind of wireless sensor network condition, access control can of inside
access control or outside access control [1]. Outside access control for WSN is
User
User
Sensor node
Base station
Figure 1.1: WSN's outside access control architecture [1].
shown in Figure 1.1 and Inside access control for WSN is shown in Figure 1.2 [1].
As mentioned in Figure 1.1 outside access control gives service to the mobile users.
In this case, base station acts as a point of network administrator and responsible
for managing security protocols and sensor nodes act as a point for data collection
for user, i.e. laptop, mobile phones, etc. Only those users are allowed to collect data
from WSN who have subscribed for that service. In case of sensor network shown in
Figure 1.2, there are no connected users. The WSN may function as a time driven
application or may function as an event-driven application. Query can only be sent
10
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Sensor node
Base station
Figure 1.2: WSN's inside access control architecture [1].
by the base station. In order to stop an adversary or attacker from sending queries
to the sensor nodes access control method must be included as a built in task in
each sensor node. So above two architecture are divided as: [1].
• Outside access control
• Inside access control
Outside access control
In this case, secure communication is performed between WSN and the outside users.
Here only the authorized uses are able to send a request for data. These requests
can be sent to some node or a set of nodes in the user proximity. This is shown in
the Figure 1.1.
Inside access control
In this case, secure communication happens in between sensor nodes and between
sensor nodes and the base stations. This architecture is shown in the Figure 1.2.
11
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1.4.2 Access Control Services
Access control services in Wireless Sensor Networks can be divided into two types [1]:
Authentication and Authorization.
Authentication
In case of authentication, a relation is established between the user and some
identier. That identier or identity is unique to that user, and generally, it
cannot be copied or modied or forged. In WSN, authentication can be classied as
two types: user authentication and authenticated querying. In user authentication
process, user's identity and name are sent by the user to the sensor node and sensor
nodes decide whether the identity sent by the user is valid or not i.e. identity belongs
to that user or not. However, in case of authenticated querying, it is decided whether
a query comes from an authorized user or a sensor node or a base station.
Authorization
In authorization, a relation is established between a user and a set of access rights.
In this process, user's name along with its requested operations i.e. read or write,
is sent to the sensor nodes and then sensor nodes decide whether this user is
allowed to perform the operations as it requested or not. Generally, operation like
authentication, authorization and authenticated querying are combined as a single
operation. When a request is received the access control mechanism checks whether
or not the request is come from a legitimate entity along with its access rights, i.e.
authentication and authorization. After that it sends back a response to the user,
and that response may be the data which the user is requested, or it may be a failure
message.
12
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1.5 Authentication in Wireless Sensor Networks
Beneson et al. [9] distinguished between the inside security and the outside security
in WSNs as:
• Inside security means secure communication between the sensor nodes and
secure communication between the sensor nodes and the base station(s) or
gateway node(s).
• Outside security refers to secure communication between outside users and
sensor nodes.
Authentication in wireless sensor networks is a very crucial requirement which is
a part of both outside security and inside security. If a strong authentication
mechanism is not included, then an adversary can often generate dummy data
packets and force sensor node to relay those packets to make sensor nodes
energy exhausted. A fake message can cause sensor nodes to accept and transfer
wrong information which in turn makes sensor nodes prone to various attacks.
Authentication in wireless sensor networks can be classied into following categories
[10]:
• Authentication of base station to the sensor nodes or in between sensor nodes.
• Authentication of user to the sensor nodes.
There are many solutions given to address the base station to sensor nodes
authentication and sensor nodes to other sensor nodes authentication. In this thesis,
we focus on the authentication of users, those are outside of the sensor network, to
the sensor nodes. In this type of authentication, outside users are authenticated to
a set of sensor nodes within their directly or via base station.
1.5.1 Outside user authentication
Sensor nodes in a wireless sensor network usually collect a wide variety of data.
Those data are generally used by dierent types of users such as universities, research
13
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organization, business organization, military personnel or individuals [10]. For
example, the humidity level in an area might be useful information for a farmer.
Enemy movement through body temperature analysis is important for military
personnel. An individual may be interested to know about the weather in his
surroundings. A researcher may be interested in environmental data collected by
the sensor nodes. An oil company might be keen to obtain ocean reading data [10].
However, considering deployment and maintenance cost, it is dicult for everyone to
deploy own sensor networks to collect data of their interests. Generally, deployment
and maintenance are done by some deployment agencies. The users who want data
from WSNs pay those agencies for their required sensor data. Therefore, owners
and users of the networks are dierent for some large-scale WSNs. Sensor data in
large scale wireless sensor networks are valuable, and that is avail to only subscribed
users who paid those data. Besides these commercial applications, there are many
military applications, which gather sensitive and condential data, which should be
accessible to authorized army ocers and soldiers only. These facts raise the issue
of authentication of a legitimate user in WSNs. User authentication is a process by
which the system veries the identity of a user who wants to access the sensor nodes
data. A user authentication mechanism is necessary to prevent unauthorized users
from accessing sensor nodes data.
1.6 Motivation
In Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN), there are several challenges. A proper user
authentication scheme in a wireless sensor network is a dicult task. The main
problem for this is resource-constraint nature of the WSN. That means sensor nodes
have very limited energy, computing power and memory. Considerable progress has
been made to solve the authentication problems in WSN, but they are inadequate.
Most of the existing authentication frameworks concentrate on a specic problem in
authentication but ignore others. Most of them deal with homogeneous wireless
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sensor network. However, nowadays heterogeneous wireless sensor networks or
hierarchical wireless sensor networks are on demand due to their better performance.
In HWSNs, public key Cryptography(PKC) particularly elliptic curve cryptography
can be applied as cluster head of HWSNs having more energy, computing power and
memory. So that, a more secure user authentication protocol can be designed.
1.7 Research Objective
With the motivation as outlined in the previous section, we identify the objectives
of our research work is as follows:
• To design a user authentication scheme in a hierarchicalwireless sensor network
which can address all the problems of the former schemes.
• To make the scheme secure against all possible attacks.
• To make the scheme scalable in terms of sensor node addition anduser addition
• Compare the scheme in terms of security and computation timewithother
related schemes.
1.8 Organization of The Thesis
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows.
Chapter 2 describes existing works on userauthentication in Wireless Sensor
Networks.
InChapter 3, the proposed approach is discussed in detail including Network Model
and Elliptic curve cryptography overview.
In Chapter 4, analysis of a proposed scheme is given.
Finally, in Chapter 5, concluding remark is given.
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1.9 Summary
This chapter gives brief overview of wireless sensor networks. There are various
obstacle in WSNs like limited resources, unreliable Communication and unattended
operation . Various secuirty requirements needs to be taken into consideration like
data condentiality, data integrity, data Freshness and so on. There are dierent
types of challenges related to access control in WSNs. Then it gives a brief overview
about user authentication in WSNs.
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2.1 Introduction
Authentication is a process of proving an entity's identity. User authentication
in case of wireless sensor network is a very critical task, as sensor nodes are
deployed in unattached environment and are prone to possible hostile network
attacks. User authentication in wireless sensor networks may be designed using some
user credentials like user's ID and a password known only to the user, or it may be
a smart card along with like user's ID and a password. There are two approaches to
achieve user authentication in case of WSNs [10]. First one is distributed approach.
In this type of approach, the sensor nodes that receive the user request locally verify
it and process the user's query. In this case, involvement of third party like base
station is not required. However, this approach puts more loads on the sensor nodes
and is not preferred as sensor nodes have very limited resources. Another approach
is a centralize one. In this type of approach user send a log-in request to a central
entity, i.e. base station or gateway node. After successful authentication, base
station forwards the query to the sensor node for query processing. In some cases,
user sends the log-in request to the sensor node directly. The sensor node forwards
the log-in request to the base station to perform authentication. The base station
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checks the legitimacy of the user request and makes the decision to grant access to
user or not. Then it replies to the sensor node. Based on the decision sensor node
provides the data to the user or sends a denial message. This chapter reviews the
existing solutions to authentication problems in WSNs.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we have given
brief description of existing schemes along with their merits and demerits. Finally,
in Section 2.3, We summarised the chapter.
2.2 Related Work
In this section, a brief discussion of the existing user authentication schemes in the
wireless sensor network is given.
2.2.1 Watro et al. scheme
Watro et al. [11] proposed a user authentication scheme for WSN called TinyPK,
which is based on PKC (public key cryptography). Here it uses RSA [12] and Die
Hellman protocol [13]. This protocol suers from the \masquerade as a sensor node
to an unknowing user" attack [14]. After receiving the user's public key, the intruder
encrypts a session key and other parameters. Then it sends it to the user. The user
believes that the message has come from the sensor node. It decrypts the message
with the private key and uses the session key for further communication. This scheme
also computationally inecient and does not provide mutual authentication.
2.2.2 Benenson et al. scheme
Benenson et al. [9] mentioned several security issues in WSN, specically the access
control and proposed a method where the user can successfully authenticate with any
subset of n sensors. Then Benenson et al. [15] proposed another solution, which based
on Elliptic Curve Cryptography. In this scheme, sensor nodes require high storage
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space as each pair of nodes requires a secret key. Here all user queries are processed
by a single node. This node should be identied while authentication. However, in
Benenson's scheme, there is no procedure given to nd that node. This process also
requires each node to know the entire network. There is no provision to deal with
the situation where the node responsible for process the query is compromised and
sends false information [16].
2.2.3 Wong et al. scheme
Wong et al. [17] proposed an ecient user authentication scheme. It is based on
user's password and uses cryptographic hash function. It has security aws like
many logged in users with the same login-Id threat in which if an attacker has a
valid user's password, he/she can login to the sensor network. It also suers from
stolen-verier attack as both GW-node and login-node keeps the look-up table of
registered user's secret information.
2.2.4 Banerjee et al. scheme
Banerjee et al. [18] proposed a fully symmetric key based scheme for authenticating
a user in WSN. Here any node can reply to the user's query. It uses the pairwise key
pre-distribution scheme proposed by Blundo et al. [19]. The node which processes
user's query generates a nonce, and user must calculate a valid MAC for the
generated nonce and sends back this MAC to the node. If the sensor does not
receive a valid MAC, then it discards the login request. This scheme does not
provide mutual authentication and prone to node compromise attack. It does not
give clues how to nd the sensor node which will process the user's query [16].
2.2.5 Jiang et al. scheme
Jiang et al. [20] proposed a distributed user authentication scheme in WSN. It is
based on self-certied cryptosystem (SCK) which is modied to use ECC to establish
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pairwise keys in sensor networks. Here the nodes which are in the transmission range
of user, act collaboratively to nd out whether the user is allowed to access the sensor
network or not. The drawback with this scheme is that each node which receives
the access request from the user has to compute a pairwise key which will be shared
with the user. It also uses an encrypted nonce using ECC, which is an expensive
task for sensor node [16].
2.2.6 Tseng et al. scheme
Tseng et al. [21] proposed a user authentication scheme which is an improved version
of Wong et al. [17] scheme. It is resistance to reply attack and forgery attack and
also allows a user to change his/her password freely. It also allows a user to login
from any sensor node in the network. After receiving the login request from user
sensor node forward this request to GW-node, which veries authenticity of the user.
User registration is performed at the GW-node. The weakness of the scheme is, it
cannot resist node compromise attack, and it requires time synchronization, which
is a dicult task in case of WSN [16].
2.2.7 Das scheme
M.L. Das [14] proposed a two-factor user authentication scheme in wireless sensor
network. He mentioned security vulnerabilities in Wong et al. [17] scheme like many
logged-in users with same login-Id threat and stolen verier attack as GW-node and
login-node maintain a lookup table of the entire registered user's secret information.
He proposed protocol to overcome the security aws of Wong et al. [17] scheme. He
used a two-factor user authentication scheme based on a smart card and password.
However, it cannot solve the problem like DoS attack and node compromise attack
[22]. Here user cannot freely and securely change his/her password. Another problem
is time synchronization as it uses the time stamp to restrict replay attack.
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2.2.8 Nyang and Lee scheme
Nyang and Lee [23] proposed a user authentication scheme which is improved version
of Das's two-factor authentication protocol. They have shown that ML. Das [14]
scheme is vulnerable to gateway node impersonation attack, node compromise attack
and password guessing attack. They have tried to overcome these problems in their
proposed scheme. However, their scheme is vulnerable to attacks like parallel session
attack, privileged-insider attack [24] and it also does not provide option for changing
password. It suers from the time synchronization problem.
2.2.9 Khan and Alghathbar scheme
Khan and Alghathbar [25] showed that ML. Das [14] scheme is not secure against
gateway-node bypass attack, does not provide mutual authentication and also
vulnerable to privileged insider attack. They also showed that ML. Das scheme
does not have the provision to change password. They proposed a scheme which
overcomes those security aws. But it suers from parallel session attack, partial
mutual authentication [24]. It needs time synchronization to restrict the replay
attack.
2.2.10 He et al. scheme
He et al. [26] proposed an improved scheme based on ML. Das [14] scheme. It keeps
all the merit of the ML. Das [14] scheme and provides protocols to restrict insider
attack and impersonation attack and provides methods to update the password.
2.2.11 Cheikhrouhou et al. scheme
Cheikhrouhou et al. [27] proposed a light-weight user authentication scheme for
wireless sensor networks. Here user uses a PDA to authenticate himself/herself. It
uses AES for encryption and decryption. In this proposed scheme, the administrator
chooses a secret key x and loads it in the system server and coordinator node. This
21
Chapter 2 Literature Survey
secret x is used by the system server for registering the users. The coordinator uses
this secret to verify the authenticity of users. Here a secret S is computed using
secret x by the coordinator node. Here the problem is, if the coordinator node is
compromised, all secret values of users will be known to the intruder who will create
a valid ID and a secret value S [16].
2.2.12 Tseng et al. scheme
Tseng et al. [28] proposed a robust user authentication scheme for wireless
sensor network based on elliptic curve crypto-system with self-certicates. In
this scheme, KDC (key distribution center) is responsible for initialing system
parameters, generating identity, generating private/public key-pair and distributing
the certicate to each user and each sensor node. The problem is both users and
sensor nodes have to store a lot of parameters. Here the user's identity is veried by
the sensor node by checking the signature using Elliptic Curve, which is a costly task.
It also suers from DoS attack. Here by sending invalid certicates or signature to
the sensor node the attacker can exhaust the memory at the node or make the node
running out of energy [16].
2.2.13 Kumar et al. scheme
Kumar et al. [29] proposed an ecient two-factor user authentication framework
for wireless sensor networks, which is based on password and smart card, and it
uses one-way hash function. This scheme provides mutual authentication and gives
user facility to change password at need. However, the problem here is, it does not
restrict privileged insider attack as the password is sent to the base station in plain
text. It also suers from the synchronization problem as it uses the time stamp for
avoiding replay attack.
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2.2.14 Fan et al. scheme
Fan et al. [30] proposed an ecient and DoS-resistance user authentication scheme
for two-tiered wireless sensor network. In this scheme, the user authenticates with
Master Node / Cluster head in order to access information from the nodes in its
cell. There is no provision to update the data table of user, so the user cannot
be authenticated to Master Node not mentioned in the data table, even if he is
legitimate one if some urgent requirement arises [16]. This scheme uses time stamps
to avoid replay attack. However, time synchronization in the wireless sensor network
is very dicult to achieve.
2.2.15 Xue et al. scheme
Xue et al. [31] a temporal-credential-based mutual authentication and key agreement
scheme for wireless sensor networks. It managed to provide mutual authentication
and session key between user and sesnor node. However, here user cannot change
password freely. It does not restrict privileged insider attack, prone to smart card
security breach attack and there is no provision of identity protection [32]. It also
needs time synchronization to prevent replay attack.
2.3 Summary
This chapter gives a brief idea about various existing authentication protocol in
WSNs. Above discussed existing works target some authentication-related problem
but ignore others. They have both advantages and disadvantages. This motivates
us to design an improved authentication protocol in WSNs.
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3.1 Introduction
In a wireless sensor network (WSN), huge numbers of sensor nodes are deployed
in the target eld. After their deployment, the sensor nodes form ad-hoc
infrastructure-less wireless networks. Then these nodes communicate with each
other using wireless communication within their communication range. Those sensor
nodes gather environmental data and transferred those data to a single point called
base station or gateway node (GW node). Here data are routed to the base station
via the multi-hop communication path. These sensor nodes are easy to deploy. They
can be dropped on a particular area from the truck or plane, and then each sensor
node coordinates with their neighboring sensor nodes, and together these nodes form
a network which nally linked to base station [3]. These tiny sensors have limited
energy, low processing power and less memory. However, they play a very important
role in various areas like real-time trac monitoring, military sensing and tracking,
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building safety monitoring, measurement of seismic activity, wildlife monitoring and
so on. When a user wants some data, he/she puts a query to the GW node or
base station and GW node gives data collected from the sensor node. Consider the
situation like a battle eld where users are in the deployed area, and they need
real-time data. In those situations if they collect data from the GW node the data
may not be real-time as there is always transmission delay or periodic nature of
data collection. In those cases, the appropriate decision cannot be taken quickly
and correctly. So they need to collect data from the sensor node directly. If the
data in the wireless sensor network are made available to users on demand, then
authentication of user must be ensured before allowing the user to access data.
A proper user authentication scheme in the wireless sensor network is a dicult
task. The main problem for this is resource-constraint nature of the WSN. That
means sensor nodes have very limited energy, computing power and memory. As
cryptographic concepts like public key cryptography take more computing power
and require more energy, their use is avoided here. However, the use of PKC based
on elliptic curve cryptography is feasible in case of wireless sensor network [33], [34].
Comparing RSA and ECC, it is found that RSA is based on integer factorization and
the best algorithm to solve this integer factorization is sub-exponential whereas the
best algorithm to solve ECC is exponential [34]. That's why compare to RSA. ECC
can provide the same level of security with smaller key. ECC of key length 160 bits
give the same level of security as RSA of 1024 bits key length [34]. This dierence
in length also aects the performance. For that reason, RSA consumes more energy
than ECC [35]. As in case of WSN, there is limited energy, computational power
and memory so ECC is preferred.
Here a smart-card based user authentication scheme in hierarchical wireless
sensor network using ECC is proposed. This scheme combines ECDH and
cryptographic hash function to provide authentication as well as a session key for
further communication between user and cluster head.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 Network model is
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given. In Section 3.3, overview of ECC is described. Section 3.4 describes the whole
proposed scheme. Finally, in Section 3.5, we summarised the chapter.
3.2 Network Model
In traditional WSN, there is a trusted base station which is responsible for collecting
data from the sensor nodes and also responsible for processing requests from the
users. Here the sensor nodes have very limited energy, computing power and less
memory storage. These sensor nodes also have a low transmission range. This
architecture performs smoothly for small networks. For larger networks hierarchical
wireless sensor network [2] (HWSN) is preferred. In this type of network, there is
a hierarchy which is based on their capabilities, i.e. sensor node, cluster head and
base station from lower to higher level.
Sensor node: These nodes are the generic sensor node. These nodes have very
limited energy, computing power and short transmission range. In a cluster, these
nodes communicate with the cluster head of that cluster. These nodes do the actual
sensing job and then share the information with the cluster head.
Cluster head: These are a special type of nodes, which have more resources than
generic sensor nodes. They have more energy, computing power, memory storage
and also a higher transmission range. These cluster heads collect data from the
sensor nodes in its cluster and communicate those data with other cluster heads
as well as with base station. As they have the higher computing power, they can
process complicated computing operations.
Base station: This is a powerful node having a wide communication range. The
base station is not limited by energy, computing power or memory. It is also an
access point for human interaction.
There are so many advantages of using HWSN. The cluster structure of HWSN
makes it stable. If a user wants to know the information for a particular area, it
can get from the cluster head within that area directly. It makes the sensor nodes
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Figure 3.1: A hierarchical wireless sensor network model [2].
more ecient as they are not involved in transmission and user query processing.
It also helps in eliminating redundant data. It improves network life time and also
reduces network trac and contention. The main advantage of this architecture is,
cluster heads have more computing power and energy powerful security protocol can
be integrated.
3.3 Overview of ECC
Weierstrass equation for the elliptic curve is y2 = x2 + ax + b in which a and b is
a real number. It is the simpler form of equation for the elliptic curve dened over
the real number. The equation must satisfy  =  16(4a3 + 27b2) 6= 0. Let Fq
denote the nite eld of points, where q is a large prime number and containing x,
y, a, b elements E is a suitably chosen Elliptic curve dened over Fq. The points of
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the equation and the point at innity O compose the elliptic curve group over real
numbers. A large prime number n is selected such that nP = O using the elliptic
curve addition algorithm. Here nP means elliptic curve multiplication. P is a base
point in the generator point E [36] [37]. Security of ECC relies on the diculties of
following problems [38].
Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP): given pubic key point F = P , it is hard to
compute the secrete key .
Computational Die-Hellman Problem (CDHP): given point elements P and P ,
it is hard to compute P .
3.4 Proposed Authentication Protocol
In this section, a user authentication scheme for WSNs is presented, which assures
the access and transfer of data to the legitimate user only. For that, rst the user
must register himself and on successful registration, the base station personalizes
a smart card to the registered user. Under the network model mentioned in the
section 3.2, the entire WSN is divided into number of clusters. Each cluster is
administered by a cluster head. Each user has some device (like PDA), which has
the ability to perform computational operations and commutate with cluster heads.
Whenever a user needs some data, it can authenticate itself to the network and
access data collected within the cluster from the cluster head.
3.4.1 Notations Used
In Table 3.1, the list of notations used in this proposed scheme is given. In this
scheme, SHA-1 is considered to be as secure hash function. SHA-1 is one-way hash
function, i.e. for a given y = h(x), it is hard to nd x [39], [37]. cntr is a counter used
to specify communication between cluster head and base station. It is automatically
incremented with new session and last cntr for each cluster head is stored in the
database of base station.
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Table 3.1: List of notations used in the proposed scheme
Notation Denition
Ui User i
IDi Identity of Ui
PWi Password of Ui
Ni A secret random number known to Ui
BS Base station.
CHj Cluster head in j
th cluster
IDCHj Identier of cluster head CHj
Sn Sensor node
xa A secret known to base station
K Symmetric key of BS
xCHj A secret shared between CHj and BS
(:) Cryptographic one-way hash functionL
XOR operator
jj String concatenation operator
q The order of the underlying nite eld Fq
E A suitably chosen Elliptic curve dened over Fq
P A base point in the generator point E
n The prime order of P
O The point at innity, where nP = O and P 6= O
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3.4.2 Registration Phase
When a new user Ui wants to register himself/herself with WSN, he/she needs to
perform following steps:
• The user Ui selects an identier IDi, password PWi and a random number
Ni to compute masked password MPWi = h(PWijjNi). User Ui provides the
identier IDi and masked passwordMPWi to the base station BS via a secure
channel.
• if the above request is accepted, the base station BS computes Ai =
h(h(IDijjxa)jjMPWi), Bi = h(IDijjxa)
L
MPWi and Ci = h(xajjK).
• Then BS issues a tamper-proof smart card with Ai, Bi, Ci and h(:) stored in
it.
• After receiving smart card, user enters Ni into the smart card.
3.4.3 Login Phase
When a user Ui wants to access real-time data from the WSNs, he/she needs to
perform following steps:
• User Ui insert the smart card into the smart card reader then enters his/her
identier IDi and password PWi into the reader terminal. Smart card
computes the masked password of the user Ui as MPW

i = h(PWijjNi) and
ai = Bi
L
MPW i .
• Then it computes Ai = h(aijjMPW i ) and checks whether it is equal to the
stored Ai. If they are equal smart card reader sends a hello massage to the BS.
If not, then report wrong password PWi to the user. This process performs up
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Figure 3.2: Registration Phase.
to some predened number of times so that it can withstand password guessing
attack by using stolen or lost smart.
• Upon receiving the hello message the BS sends a random nonce RN1 to the
reader.
• Then the reader computes DIDi = IDi
L
h(CijjRN1) and selects a
random number [2; n   2]. After that it computes P and Ru =
h(DIDijjP jjaijjRN1).
• Smart card reader sends a message < DIDi; P;Ru; RN1 > to the base station
BS.
3.4.4 Authentication Phase
When BS receives login message < DIDi; P;Ru; RN1 > from the user Ui, it
perform s following step to authentication with the user Ui.
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• BS rst checks whether received RN1 is fresh. If it is fresh, then it computes
IDi = DIDi
L
h(h(xajjK)jjRN1) and ai = h(IDijjxa) and use ai to computes
Ru = h(DIDijjP jjai jjRN1). Then it checks if Ru = Ru. If it holds, BS
accepts the login request and proceeds to the next step.
• BS selects a cluster head nearest to the user. It retrieves cntr
for that cluster head from its database. Then it computes Sb =
h(DIDijjIDCHj jjxCHj jjP jjcntr).
• BS sends a message < DIDi; P; Sb; cntr > to the corresponding cluster head
CHj.
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• After receiving the message in previous step from BS, rst CHj checks whether
received cntr is greater than or equal to the stored cntr in its memory. If yes
then it computes Sb = h(DIDijjIDCHj jjxCHj jjP jjcntr). Then cluster head
checks if Sb = S

b . If it holds, the cluster head accepts the login request and
updates the previous cntr with received cntr and proceeds to the next step.
• Then it selects a random number [2; n  2]. After that it computes P and
TCHj = h(DIDijjIDCHj jjxCHj jjP jjcntr) and session key SK = P .
• The cluster head sends a message < DIDi; IDCHj ; P; TCHj ; cntr > to the base
station.
• After receiving the message in previous step from the cluster head, BS
checks whether the received cntr is equal to the saved cntr for that
cluster head in its memory. If it is equal, then it computes T CHj =
h(DIDijjIDCHj jjxCHj jjP jjcntr) and checks if TCHj = T CHj . If it holds, then
it accepts the request. Then BS increments cntr by one and proceeds to the
next step.
• Then BS selects a random number [2; n   2]. After that it computes P ,
z = P and Vr = h(zjjP jjaijjIDCHj jjP jjRN1).
• Then BS sends a message < Vr; P; IDCHj ; P;RN1 > to the user Ui.
• After receiving the message in previous step from the BS, the user Ui checks
whether received RN1 is equal to the RN1 in its temporary memory. If they are
equal, then smart card of user Ui computes L = P and uses it to compute
V r = h(LjjP jjaijjIDCHj jjP jjRN1). Then it checks if Vr = V r . If it holds,
then smart card of Ui computes session key SK = P .
The above generated session key is used in further communication between user Ui
and cluster head CHj.
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Figure 3.4: Authentication Phase.
3.4.5 Password Change Phase
Whenever a user Ui wants to change his/her password, he/she has to perform
following steps. Here all steps are performed locally. Involvement of the base station
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is not required.
• User Ui insert his/her smart card into the smart card reader. Then the reader
terminal asks the user to insert his/her identier IDi, current password PW
old
i .
After that smart card computes the masked value of current password as
MPW oldi = h(PW
old
i jjNi), ai = Bi
L
MPW oldi and A

i = h(aijjMPW oldi ).
• This computed Ai is compared with Ai, which is stored in the smart card.
If they match, proceeds to next steps. If they do not match, then report
wrong password PWi to the user. This process performs up to some predened
number of times so that it can withstand password guessing attack by using
stolen or lost smart card.
• Then it asks the user to enter a new password PW newi . Then it computes the
masked value of the new password as MPW newi = h(PW
new
i jjNi). Then it
computes Anewi = h(aijjMPW newi ) and Bnewi = ai
L
MPW newi .
• Finally, the stored Ai and Bi are replaced with Anewi and Bnewi respectively in
the smart card memory.
Password Change Phase
1. Inserts samrt card.
Enter and current password .
Then smart card computes
.
2. if 
then go to next step.
Otherwise, it will terminate the process.
3. Enter the new password
Computes 
4. Update the stored and
and
with
.
Figure 3.5: Password Change Phase.
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3.4.6 Dynamic Node Addition
In a wireless sensor network, there are chances that some sensor nodes or cluster
heads are captured by the attackers, or they expire due to energy consumption. In
that situation, new nodes are added to the network. In this proposed scheme as
there is no common parameter shared between the users and cluster head as well as
users and sensor nodes, so any number of nodes can be added to the network freely
at any time. Here the same smart card is used to perform authentication with newly
added cluster heads.
3.5 Summary
In this chapter, a user authentication scheme based on elliptic curve cryptography for
large scale hierarchical wireless sensor network is presented. The proposed scheme
applies ECC to establish a session key between user and cluster head. This also
facilitates option for password change and dynamic node addition.
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Analysis of Proposed Scheme
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we have analysed the proposed scheme in terms of security and
compares the computation time of the proposed scheme with other related schemes.
In security analysis, we consider various attacks like privileged insider attack, replay
attack, guessing attack, stolen verier attack, man-in-the-middle attack, DoS attack,
password change attack, many logged-in users with same login-id attack, smart card
breach attack, masquerade attack. Other criteria like mutual authentication, use
anonymity and resiliency against node capture attack are also considered. Then in
computation cost comparison section, computation cost of the proposed scheme is
compared with other related schemes.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The Section 4.2 shows the
security analysis of the proposed scheme Then the Section 4.2 shows the security
and computation comaprison of the proposed scheme with other related schemes.
Finally, in Section 4.4, We summarised the chapter.
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4.2 Security Analysis
This section analyzes security of the proposed scheme which is based on security of
ECC described in Section 3.3 and diculties associated with one-way hash function.
This proposed scheme can resist against the following attacks.
Privileged insider attack
In this scheme, the user does not send his/her password in plain text during
registration. Here the password PWi is rst masked to produce MPWi, which
is h(PWijjNi). It is computationally infeasible to nd PWi from MPWi due to
one way property of the hash function. So the privileged insider of the base station
cannot know the password PWi. Thus he/she cannot impersonate the user in those
servers where the user might have registered himself/herself with the same password.
So this proposed scheme is resistance to the privileged insider attack.
Replay attack
In case of replay attack, a legal entity's transmitted message is intercepted and that
message is replayed later by an adversary. However, in this scheme, a random nonce
is used to restrict replay message between user and base station and a cntr or a
counter is used to restrict replay message between base station and cluster head.
Guessing attack
Consider the situation where a user lost his/her smart card, and it is found by an
attacker or is stolen by an attacker. In that case, the attacker cannot impersonate
that user by using the smart card because no one can nd the password from the
Bi without knowing the value of secrete xa, which is only known to base station.
This secret is also protected by cryptographic one-way hash function. The shared
secret ai between Ui and BS is also protected in Ru and Vr by same cryptographic
one-way hash function. So this scheme is resistance to guessing attack.
Stolen verier attack
As this scheme does not keep any password/verier table at the base station or
cluster head, so no one can steal password/verier table. So it is resistance to stolen
verier attack. Here even in registration phase user does not send password directly
38
Chapter 4 Analysis of Proposed Scheme
to the BS. It is masked and sent to the base station to produce smart card. Then
the masked password is deleted from temporary memory of base station.
Man-in-the-middle attack
Suppose an attacker intercept a login request message < DIDi; P;Ru; RN1 >,
then it generates a random number  and computes P , which is later used
to generates session key. However, it cannot modify the login request message to
< DIDi; 
P;Ru; RN1 > as the attacker does not know the secret xa, which is used
to calculate Ru. Thus man-in-the-middle attack is not possible in this proposed
scheme.
Mutual authentication
In case of mutual authentication, both entities in a communication link authenticate
to each other. In this proposed scheme, mutual authentication is assured between
cluster head (CH) and base station (BS) as well as user and BS. Here rst
BS is authenticated to CHj using Sb = h(DIDijjIDCHj jjxCHj jjP jjcntr). Sb
can be computed only by CHj and BS as the secret xCHj is known exclusively
to CHj and BS. Similarly CHj is authenticated to BS using TCHj =
h(DIDijjIDCHj jjxCHj jjP jjcntr).
The user is authenticated to BS by using Ru = h(DIDijjP jjaijjRN1) likewise,
BS is authenticated with the user using Vr = h(zjjP jjaijjIDCHj jjP jjRN1). Only
legitimate user who has the correct password can only extract ai and hence can
compute Ru. Similarly BS can compute Vr as it has the secret xa which is used to
compute ai.
DoS attack
Suppose an adversary has found or stole the smart card of a legitimate user
Ui. However, in this proposed scheme, the smart card computes A

i =
h(h(IDijjxa)jjh(PWijjNi)) and compares it with the stored value of Ai in smart
card's memory. This comparison will show the validity of user identity IDi and
password PWi before the password updates procedure. But the adversary cannot
guess both user identity IDi and password PWi correctly in polynomial time. If
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login failure exceeds some predened number of times, then the smart card will be
locked immediately. Thus the proposed scheme is secure against denial of service
attack.
Password change attack
This scheme is resistance to password change attack. Suppose for a stolen smart card
if the attacker wants to change password he/she still must know the old password
PW oldi . Smart card allows a predened number of times to enter correct the old
password. If the attacker fails to enter the old password correctly, then that smart
card is blocked.
User anonimity
In this proposed scheme, in each login request user anonymity is preserved.
Consider a situation, where an attacker has intercepted a login request message
< DIDi; P;Ru; RN1 >. But it cannot retrieve any static parameter from this
message as all the values here are session dependent. Only base station can nd IDi
from the DIDi as it has the knowledge of secret parameter xa and its symmetric
key K. Hence in the presented scheme, an intruder or attacker cannot identify the
user trying to login.
Many logged-in user with same login-id attack
This scheme can prevent the risk of many logged-in users with the same login ID as
well as parallel session attack. Here login process starts only when the user inserts
his/her card into the card reader, and all computations is performed only during the
period when the card is still inside the card reader. Once the card is removed the
login process is terminated.
Smart card breach attack
Suppose a smart card is lost or stolen. Although it is assumed that a smart
card cannot be cracked, an adversary may perform side channel attacks, including
dierential power analysis and invasive attack and extract parameters like Ai, Bi,
Ci and Ni. Then the adversary tries to impersonate the user to login to the Base
Station. For that purpose, adversary must be able to create a valid login request
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message< DIDi; P;Ru; RN1 >. Here Ru = h(DIDijjP jjaijjRN1) and to compute
ai the adversary must have knowledge of either MPWi or xa. But adversary cannot
nd MPWi as he does not have knowledge of PWi and he also cannot extract xa
from the Ci as it is protected by one-way hash function. Thus, the proposed scheme
can resist smart card breach attack.
Resilience against node capture attack
As sensor nodes and cluster heads are deployed in a hostile environment, those
nodes can easily capture by an adversary. So the adversary can steal the stored
secret information in those nodes. Suppose some cluster heads are captured by an
attacker. So the attacker knows the secret xCHj stored in the cluster head. As xCHj
for each cluster head is dierent, and they are stored in the cluster heads before
deployment, so only those cluster heads will send false data to the user. However,
other non-compromised nodes will continue to communicate securely with the users.
It means, if some captured cluster heads are compromised, then that does not aect
secure communication between other non-compromised cluster heads and users. So
this scheme is resilience against node capture attack.
Masquerade attack
Suppose an adversary wants to impersonate himself as a legal user to the WSN.
Then he must compute a valid DIDi and Ru which will be sent to base
station with the login request. However, DIDi = IDi
L
h(CijjRN1) and Ru =
h(DIDijjP jjaijjRN1) where Ci = h(xajjK) and ai = h(IDijjxa). Only the base
station has the knowledge of secret xa and symmetric key K. So the adversary
cannot create a valid DIDi and Ru as he does not know the value of xa and K. So
this scheme is resistance to masquerade attack.
4.3 Comparison with Related Schemes
In this section, the performance of the proposed scheme is compared with some
selected existing related schemes: Watro et al. [11] scheme, Wong et al. [17] scheme,
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ML Das [14] scheme, Nyang and Lee [23] scheme, Khan and Alghathbar [25] scheme,
Kumar et al. [29] scheme, Fan et al. [30] scheme and Xue et al. scheme [31].
In Table 4.1, the comparison of the security features among dierent schemes is
presented. Here it shows that the proposed scheme is stronger in terms of security
features. Our scheme along with Watro et al. [11] and Khan and Alghathbar [25]
provides protection against privileged-insider attack. Password change or update
feature is supported by our scheme, Khan and Alghathbar [25] and Kumar et al. [29]
scheme whereas only our scheme is resilient against node capture attack. Mutual
authentication is supported by our scheme, Watro et al. [11], Nyang and Lee [23]
and Fan et al. [30] scheme and Xue et al. scheme [31]. Only our scheme, Nyang and
Lee [23], Fan et al. [30] scheme and Xue et al. scheme [31] establishes secret session
key between the user and sensor/cluster head. Only our scheme provides an option
for dynamic node addition. In our scheme time synchronization is not needed to
provide protection against replay attack.
In Table 4.2, the comparison of computational cost in dierent phases of the
proposed scheme with other schemes is given. Here the computation cost for XOR
is not considered as it is negligible. This scheme uses cluster head to authenticate
with user and cluster head is more resource-rich compared to usual sensor node.
This scheme uses the advantage of using computational power of base station and
cluster head to provide more secure login to a user.
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Lastly considering computation cost at sensor node/cluster head, the proposed
scheme uses two hash operation and two elliptic curve multiplication in the whole
authentication process. As cluster heads have more computing power and energy
resources so above operations are feasible. The proposed scheme is also stronger
than other scheme in term of security. It includes six message transfers in the whole
authentication process. The rst two messages are to receive random nonce from
the base station. This random nonce helps this scheme from time synchronization
problem which is a very dicult task in case of WSN.
4.4 Summary
In this chapter, we have done security analysis of the proposed scheme and compare
security features of our scheme with other existing schemes. Then the comparison of
computational cost in dierent phases of the proposed scheme with other schemes is
shown. Considering over-all scenarios this scheme is better than all other schemes.
The scheme is also scalable in terms of user addition, cluster head addition and
sensor node addition.
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Conclusion and Future Work
5.1 Conclusion
In this thesis, a user authentication scheme based on elliptic curve cryptography for
large scale hierarchical wireless sensor network is presented. Here feasibility of ECC
in context of WSN is demonstrated. The proposed user authentication scheme can
address all the problems of the former schemes and provide better security. This
scheme allows the user to authenticate at both the base station and the cluster
heads inside WSN. It provides mutual authentication between user and base station
as well as base station and cluster head. The proposed scheme also provides the
option for dynamic node addition where there is no need to update any information
in user smart card for accessing real-time data for any addition or replacement of
cluster heads in the networks. After successful authentication, both user and cluster
head from which data will be forward to the user, will be able to establish a secrete
session key between them. Later using this session key, the user can contact the
cluster head for real-time data inside WSN. This scheme implements merit of using
ECC-based mechanism in WSN and enhances the WSN authentication with higher
security than other protocols.
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5.2 Future Work
For future work, we suggest to do improvement of the protocol by adding access
rights of dierent users along with the authentication.
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